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Abstract 
In this paper we propose a dual encryption protocol f o r  
scalable secure multicasting. Multicasting is a scalable so- 
lution f o r  group communication. It howevel; poses several 
unique security problems. We use hierarchical subgroup- 
ing to achieve scalability. Third party hosts or  members of 
the multicast group are designated as  subgroup managers. 
They are responsible for  secret key distribution and group 
membership management at the subgroup level. Unlike ex- 
isting secure multicast protocols, our protocol need not trust 
the subgroup managers with the distribution of data encryp- 
tion keys. The dual encryption protocol proposed in this pa-  
per  distributes encrypted data encryption keys via subgroup 
managers. We also present a class$cation of the existing se- 
cure multicast protocols, compare their relative merits and 
show the advantages of our protocol. 
1. Introduction 
With the widespread use of the Internet, securing data 
transmissions is an important requirement for many appli- 
cations. Several protocols exist to address security in data 
networks with respect to unicasting [6, 101. Unfortunately, 
these protocols cannot be easily extended to protect mul- 
ticast data. Multicasting poses several problems that do 
not come up in securing unicast data transfers [2]. First, 
multicast addresses are not private which enables any in- 
terested host to join the multicast session without any hin- 
drance. Next, multicast data is transmitted over many chan- 
nels of the network which presents multiple opportunities 
for attacks such as eavesdropping. Furthermore, any host in 
the Internet can send irrelevant data to the multicast group, 
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which may cause congestion. The universal knowledge of 
multicast addresses also allows any host to pose as a member 
of the group, thereby allowing it to gain access to the multi- 
cast data. Finally, adversaries can possibly disrupt the mul- 
ticast protocol itself by posing as legitimate members of the 
group. 
Multicasting is a scalable way of transmitting data to a 
group hosts and any secure multicasting protocol must be 
scalable as well. A secure group communication protocol 
must provide group membership control, secure key distri- 
bution, and secure data transfer. If the multicast group mem- 
bership is dynamic, i.e., if the groupmembers join and leave 
during the course of a multicast session, the secret keys need 
to be updated accordingly. In other words, members of a 
multicast session must not be able to access the multicast 
data transmitted before their membership has begun or after 
their membership has expired. Scalability in this context im- 
plies that the overhead involved in key updates, data trans- 
mission and encryption must be independent of the size of 
the multicast group. The other requirement of scalability is 
that the addition or removal of a host from the group must 
not affect all the members of the group. The second rule is 
called “1 affects n” scalability problem [ 111. 
Several protocols have been proposed to support secure 
multicasting [ l ,  4, 7, 9, 11, 14, 151. Based on the corre- 
sponding key distribution protocols, we can broadly classify 
them into three categories, viz., centralized flat schemes, 
distributed flat schemes and hierarchical schemes [4]. Cen- 
tralized flat schemes [3,4,8,9] consist of a single entity dis- 
tributing the encryption keys to the group members. These 
schemes suffer from the 1 affects n scalability problem. 
The distributed flat schemes trust all the group members 
equally [4]. Members joining early create and distribute the 
encryption keys. Trusting all the members makes this proto- 
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col vulnerable to security attacks from inside the group. Fi- 
nally, the hierarchical schemes [ 1 ,  4, l l ,  14, 151 distribute 
encryption keys via a distribution tree. The schemes pro- 
posed by Caronni et. al [4], Wallner et. al [ 141 and Wong e t  
a1 [ 151 suffer from the 1 affects n scalability problem. The 
other hierarchical schemes entrust the internal nodes of the 
tree with the distribution of the encryption keys. But they 
offer no mechanism to hide multicast data from these third 
party entities. 
We propose a dual encryption protocol (DEP) for scal- 
able secure multicasting which supports one-to-many group 
communication. We use hierarchical subgrouping of multi- 
cast members to address scalability. Each subgroup is man- 
aged by a subgroup manager (SGM) which assists in key 
distribution as well as group access control. We distinguish 
between participants and members of the multicast group. 
Members of the multicast group are leaf nodes and internal 
nodes (SGMs) in the key distribution tree, that are entitled 
to the multicast data. On the other hand, participants of the 
multicast group are SGMs that assist in enforcing the secure 
multicast protocol without having any access to the multi- 
cast data. The dual encryption scheme enables our protocol 
to hide multicast data from the participants. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We de- 
scribe the dual encryption protocol for scalable secure mul- 
ticasting in Section 2. Section 3 compares existing secure 
multicast protocols to our protocol. The final section lists 
our conclusions and describes future directions in this area. 
Authentication Information 
2. Anatomy of the dual encryption protocol 
Authorization Infomation 
In this section we describe the dual encryption proto- 
col for scalable secure multicasting. Our protocol supports 
secure one-to-many group communication, dynamic group 
membership and is scalable. We use hierarchical subgroup- 
ing of multicast members to address scalability. Each sub- 
group is managed by a subgroup manager (SGM). SGMs 
are either routers or hosts in the network that can handle the 
workload of managing a subgroup of the multicast group. 
We assume that the SGMs conform to the secure multicast 
protocol and do not actively participate in disrupting it. We 
distinguish between participants and members of the group. 
Members of the group are end-hosts or SGMs that are en- 
titled to the multicast data. On the other hand, participants 
of the group are SGMs that assist in enforcing the secure 
multicast protocol without having any access to the multi- 
cast data. With this distinction, it is possible to have SGMs 
assist in the secure multicast protocol without getting access 
to multicast data. 
We use two sets of encryption keys that assist in se- 
cure distribution of data encryption keys to multicast mem- 
bers. The first set of keys called local subgroup keys (LS) 
are used by SGMs to distribute encrypted data encryption 
I Host Name I Multicast Group Name I 
I Host Identifier I Multicast Group Identifier I 
Membership Duration I [Start time, Finish Time] 1 I Host Public Key 
[ Signed by Certification Authority 1 
Figure 1. Capability certificate 
keys to their corresponding subgroup members. The sec- 
ond set of keys called top level key encrypting keys (KEK) 
are used by the sender to hide data encryption keys from 
participant SGMs. We classify the members and partici- 
pants of the multicast group into key groups. The members 
in each key group get access to the same KEK. Nodes of 
each subtree rooted at one of the sender’s children belong 
to the same key group. Nodes of different subtrees rooted 
at the sender’s children may belong to the same key group. 
The number of key groups however is limited by the num- 
ber of SGMs among the sender’s children. Our protocol uses 
public-key [ 10, 12, 131 encryption for securely distributing 
the top level KEKs and the subgroup keys. 
Table 1. Notation used in this DaDer 
S Sender 




Local subgroup key managed by SGM i 
Set of subgroup members of SGM i 
Set of nodes of the key distribution tree in the 
key group i 
KEKj 
DEK 
Key encrypting key corresponding to the key 
Data encryption key used in encrypting multi- 
cast data 
group K 
ccx Capability Certificate of x 
AC, 
KUX Public-key of x 
KRx Private-key of x 
EP Public-key encryption 
ES Secret-key encryption 
HV Hash value 
x -+ y :  w 
Authorization Certificate issued to x by s 
x sends “w” to y 
We use capability certificates (see Figure 1) to enforce 
group access control. For large multicast groups, access 
control lists can be very large. Furthermore, we may not 
know all the group members in advance. Our protocol re- 
quires that all the members obtain a capability certificate 
from designated certification authorities. These certificates 
authenticate hosts and authorize them to be members of 
the multicast group. The authorization information also in- 
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cludes the time duration for which the group member is en- 
titled to multicast data. The sender and the SGMs verify the 
capability certificates before distributing encryption keys to 
group members. We list the notation used in the remainder 
of the protocol description, in Table 1. 
2.1. Initial key distribution 
-__.__- --  - _  -.. 
SGM as a participant P2’s subgroup 
End-host as a member 
Figure 2. Key distribution tree 
Figure 2 illustrates the idea of a secure multicast key dis- 
tribution tree. As depicted in the figure, members of the mul- 
ticast group are nodes of a key distribution tree. The key dis- 
tribution tree can be either an extension of a multicast data 
distribution tree (e.g. DVMRP [5]) or a virtual tree at the ap- 
plication level. Subgroup managers are represented by the 
non-leaf nodes and the children of each of these non-leaf 
nodes are subgroup members of the corresponding non-leaf 
node. Each SGM is responsible for generating a secret key 
and sharing it with all the corresponding subgroup members 
in a secure fashion. For instance in Figure 2, pl shares the 
subgroup key Up, with its children, g2 and h2. The sender 
generates the top level KEKs and a local subgroup key for 
the top level subgroup. Recall that the KEKs are used to 
hide data encryption keys from the participants of the multi- 
cast group. One KEK is generated corresponding to each of 
the key groups. These keys are distributed to the multicast 
members by the sender. A KEK is shared by all the nodes 
in a key group, that are members of the multicast group. To 
illustrate the concept of key groups, we use,the key distribu- 
tion tree shown in Figure 2. There could be at most two key 
groups, corresponding to each of the sender’s children that 
are SGMs, viz., pl and gl. hl could belong to either one of 
the key groups. 
All the members and participants of the multicast group 
must be aware of the key group they belong to. We dele- 
gate the responsibility of propagating this information to the 
subgroup managers. The sender assigns and distributes key 
group ids to the SGMs that are members of the top level 
subgroup. Each SGM disseminates its key group id to its 
subgroup members when they join the group. Thus, all the 
members and participants of the multicast session are aware 
of the corresponding key group id. Section 2.2 illustrates the 
distribution of the secret keys as a part of the join protocol 
of the dual encryption scheme. 
2.2. Join protocol 
When a new host h wants to join the secure multicast 
group, it sends a message which includes its capability cer- 
tificate, to all the SGMs of the group and waits for the first 
positive response. SGMs that can handle the additional 
workload of another member in their subgroup respond to 
this request. They first verify the capability certificate to de- 
cide whether to approve or deny the request. Assuming that 
the request is approved, each SGM validating the request 
sends a message comprising of its identity and its key group 
identity. h chooses the first positive response it receives to 
pick the subgroup it is going to join. Let us say p1 (refer to 
Figure 2) responds first. It sends its identity, p l ,  and its key 
group identity, say E to h. Since p1 replied first, h chooses 
p1 as its subgroup manager. 
The enrolling host then sends a packet with its capabil- 
ity certificate, the responding SGM’s identity and the cor- 
responding key group identity to the sender of the multi- 
cast data. The sender uses the capability certificate to decide 
whether h is an authorized member of the multicast group. 
It also checks to see if h has previously requested to join the 
multicast. This last verification is to guard against a mis- 
behaving host trying to join multiple subgroups simultane- 
ously. After the new host’s membership is validated, the 
sender generates an authorization certificate (see Figure 3) 
for h. The authorization certificate contains the new host’s 
identity (h), the corresponding SGM’s identity and the key 
group identity. The sender signs the certificate with its pri- 
vate key. The authorization certificate is an authentic record 
of the new host’s affiliation to the multicast group. Next, the 
sender sends the authorization certificate and the top level 
KEK to the joining host. The KEK sent to h corresponds 
to its key group identity. The sender encrypts the autho- 
rization certificate and the KEK with h’s public key for se- 
crecy. For example in Figure 2 the sender sends the packet, 
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E P K ~ ~ [  EPK~~[AC~] ,  EPKR.~[KEKI] 1. Note that the sender 
signs the authorization certificate and the KEK separately. 
This allows h to produce the signed authorization certificate 
without having to disclose the KEK. Finally, the sender up- 
dates its multicast membership database with the new host’s 
authorization certificate. The membership database is used 
when the sender refreshes the KEKs. 
Host Id . 
Host Public Key 
Multicast Group Id 
Key Group Id 
Membership Duration I SGM Id 
I Signed by the Sender -1 
Figure 3. Authorization certificate 
In the final phase of the join protocol, the host sends its 
signed authorization certificate to its SGM. The subgroup 
manager first adds the new host to its subgroup members’ 
list. The SGM then changes its subgroup key, signs it, en- 
crypts it with h’s public key and sends it to h. The SGM’s 
signature guards against masquerading attacks. The sub- 
group key is changed to keep the new host from decrypt- 
ing multicast data sent before it joined the group. Sepa- 
rately, the SGM multicasts its signed new subgroup key to 
all its subgroup members, encrypted with the old subgroup 
key. In our example, p1 sends EPKU~[EPKR,,~ [LSLI]] to h and 
ESu,, [EPKR~, [LS;,]] to g2 and h2. Table 2 lists the steps in 
the join protocol. In the table, h joins the group at an SGM 
g, which belongs to the key group -?(;. 
Finally, we want to stress the importance of the use of au- 
thorization certificates. They eliminate the possibility of an 
adversary with a valid capability certificate gaining access 
to all the keys managed by the sender and all the SGMs in 
the multicast group. In our protocol, the sender checks for 
duplicate joins by the same host before issuing an authoriza- 
tion certificate. These certificates authorize the joining host 
to gain access to only one local subgroup key. 
We now describe the join protocol followed by subgroup 
managers. SGMs that are members of the multicast group 
follow the join protocol describedeartier. The only change 
is that the sender updates its SGM database. Recruiting a 
participant SGM, however, is more complex. The sender 
first verifies if the participant SGM is an ex-member of the 
multicast group. If the participant SGM is in the member- 
ship database, the corresponding KEK needs to be updated. 
To change a KEK, the sender sends a message to all the 
members which hold that KEK, asking them to request the 
new KEK. The members which need the new KEK respond 
with their authorization certificates. The sender verifies the 
authorization certificates and constructs a list of members 
authorized to receive the updated KEK. The sender then 
changes the KEK, signs it, and encrypts it  with the public 
keys of all the members in the list. It then multicasts all the 
encrypted KEKs to the multicast group. Each member wait- 
ing for the new KEK decrypts the encrypted KEK intended 
for it. Finally, the sender updates its membership database 
conforming to the authorization list i t  compiled above. After 
the verification process and possible modification of a KEK, 
the join process of a participant SGM follows the same pro- 
tocol described earlier. The only exception is that a partici- 
pant SGM does not receive a KEK. 
Clearly, the process of changing a KEK is costly opera- 
tion. However, KEKs need to be changed only when an ex- 
member of the multicast group wants to rejoin as a partici- 
pant SGM. To avoid changing KEKs frequently, an applica- 
tion may deny the join request of a participant SGM if it is 
still in the membership database. 
2.3. Secure communication 
The sender generates a data encryption key (DEK) to 
be used in a conventional encryption algorithm [lo, 131. 
It sends the multicast data encrypted with the DEK to the 
group. Next, it computes a one-way hash function of the 
data and sends the hash value (HV) along with the DEK to 
multicast members securely. The members also compute the 
hash value of multicast data and compare it to the HV re- 
ceived, to verify the integrity of the data. 
While the encrypted multicast data is sent through tradi- 
tional multicast channels, the DEKs are distributed via the 
key distribution tree. We use the key distribution tree in Fig- 
ure 2 to illustrate the DEK distribution. The sender gen- 
erates a key distribution packet (ESU,~ [ESKEK~ [DEK, HV]], 
ESLS,~[ESKEK~ [DEK, HV]]), where LS, is the subgroup key 
of the top level subgroup. Each of the sender’s children de- 
crypts its part of the key distribution packet. Each of them 
then encrypts its piece of the packet with the subgroup key 
they manage and multicasts the encrypted DEK to its chil- 
dren. In our example in Figure 2,  p1 multicasts the en- 
crypted packet that contains ESLS,, [ESKEK~ [DEK, HV]], to 
g2 and h2. Similarly, other SGMs forward the encrypted 
DEK to their respective subgroup members. All the mem- 
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bers of the multicast group with a local subgroup key and 
the corresponding KEK acquire the DEK and HV. The DEK 
is used by the members to decrypt the multicast data and 
HV is used to verify the integrity of multicast data. Note 
that the SGMs that are also members of the multicast group 
will have access to the corresponding KEK. Other SGMs 
will just participate in the secure multicast protocol by man- 
aging their corresponding subgroup key and forwarding the 
encrypted DEK. Table 3 lists the steps in the DEK distribu- 
tion protocol. In the table, we assume that there are c key 
groups and that SGM gi,  which is one of the sender’s chil- 
dren, belongs to the key group K. 
2.4. Leave protocol 
The membership of a multicast group member may ex- 
pire as per the membership duration information in the ca- 
pability certificate. It is also possible that either the sender 
or the corresponding SGM may have to expel a misbehav- 
ing member. In either case, the ex-member of the multicast 
session must not be able to decrypt the multicast data. To 
do that, the corresponding SGM changes the local subgroup 
key. It then encrypts the new subgroup key with the pub- 
lic keys of each of its children and multicasts that informa- 
tion to them. Each of the children decrypts its part of that 
message and extracts the updated subgroup key. Revisiting 
our example in Figure 2, if the host hg leaves the multicast 
group, the corresponding subgroup manager, p2 changes the 
subgroup key and securely sends the new key to the hosts h8 
and hlo separately. 
Note that the KEK known to the leaving host need not 
be changed right away. The sender can periodically change 
those keys depending on the frequency of hosts rejoining 
the group. Since any member needs to know both the cor- 
responding subgroup key and the key encrypting key to de- 
crypt the DEK, changing even one of them is sufficient. We 
list the the steps of the leave protocol in Table 4. In the 
table, we assume that hi left from SGM g, where !k$ = 
{ h I ,  h2, .  . . , h,} and that LS; is the new subgroup key. 
Dual encryption of the DEK simplifies the removal of an 
SGM from the multicast group. All we need to do is to re- 
move the SGM, find a replacement and notify the subgroup 
members of the change. Note that each SGM is a mem- 
ber of a subgroup managed by its parent. The parent SGM 
removes the leaving SGM, following a procedure identical 
to that of removing a member of the multicast group. The 
sender needs to locate another SGM that replaces the leav- 
ing SGM. After finding a replacement, the sender notifies 
the members of the subgroup managed by the leaving SGM 
about their new subgroup manager. The sender also updates 
its list of SGMs. The new SGM follows the join protocol 
to become either a participant or a member of the multicast 
group. After that, it generates the subgroup key and securely 
distributes that key to its subgroup members. 
2.5. Key refresh 
The sender and the SGMs refresh their keys periodically 
to guard against eavesdropping.. To change the subgroup 
key, a subgroup manager follows the same procedure de- 
scribed in Section 2.4. In brief, the SGM changes the key, 
signs it and encrypts it with the public keys of all the sub- 
group members. It then locally multicasts the updated sub- 
group key to its subgroup members. Refreshing KEKs is a 
complex procedure and is expected to be done infrequently. 
The sender can change a KEK following the mechanism de- 
scribed in Section 2.2. In general, KEKs may be refreshed 
depending on the frequency of hosts rejoining the multicast 
group. 
2.6. Thing the number of key encrypting keys 
The number of KEKs can be between zero and the num- 
ber of SGMs in the top level subgroup. When the number of 
KEKs is zero all the SGMs automatically receive access to 
multicast data. The use of a single KEK gives us the capabil- 
ity of denying access of multicast data to SGMs. However, 
the KEK may need to be refreshedupdated more often since 
it is shared by all of the members. As the number of KEKs 
increase the refreshhpdate frequency decreases. The upper 
bound to the number of KEKs is the number of SGMs that 
are also members of the top level subgroup. 
3. Previous research in scalable key distribu- 
tion 
We summarize the previous work done in the area of 
secure scalable key distribution in this section. Most of 
the previous work in the area of secure multicasting has 
been in key distribution. We can loosely classify the exist- 
ing schemes as centralized flat key management, hierarchi- 
cal key management, and distributed flat key management 
schemes [4]. 
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Table 4. Stem in the leave Drotocol 
Centralized flat key management. In this approach 
a single entity distributes the session key to all the group 
members. The protocol suggested in Elements of Trusted 
Multicasting [8] (ETM), distributes the session key en- 
crypted with each of the group members’ public keys af- 
ter multicast data has been sent. In Group Key Manage- 
ment Protocol (GKMP) [9], the group manager shares a ses- 
sion traffic encrypting key (TEK) and key encrypting key 
(KEK) with each member. These keys are used in dis- 
tributing the group TEK and the group KEK. The Perfectly- 
Secure Dynamic-Conference Key Distribution (PDKD) [3] 
protocol describes a secret-sharing scheme for secure group 
communication. Each host in any group o f t  members can 
compute a common key, on input its share of the secret 
and the identities of the other t - 1 hosts. In the Central- 
ized Flat Key Management for Dynamic Multicast Groups 
(CFKM-DMG) [4] the group manager generates a TEK and 
2W KEKs, where W represents the number of bits in any 
member’s ID. For each bit in the ID, there are two KEKs. 
Each member receives the TEK and W KEKs correspond- 
ing to the values of each bit in its ID. 
Hierarchical key management. In this approach, the 
members of the multicast group are part of a tree-like hier- 
archical structure. The intermediate nodes in the tree assist 
in key distribution. We can further classify these schemes 
into two different groups, viz., hierarchical node based ap- 
proaches and hierarchical key based approaches. In the fol- 
lowing, the first two schemes are hierarchical node based 
and the others are hierarchical key based schemes. 
Scalable Multicast Key Distribution (SMKD) proto- 
col [ I ]  uses the Core Based Tree (CBT) architecture for mul- 
ticasting, for key distribution purposes. The primary core 
creates a session key and a key encrypting key (KEK). The 
session key, and the KEK are distributed to the secondary 
core and subsequently to other nodes as they become part of 
the distribution tree. 
Iolus [ I l l  proposes the idea of hierarchical subgroup- 
ing for scalable secure multicasting. Group security agents 
share a secret key with each of their subgroup members. 
Similarly a group security controller distributes a secret key 
to the top level subgroup. All these keys serve the purpose of 
key encrypting keys while session keys are distributed dur- 
ing multicast data transfers. 
The Centralized Tree-Based Key Management (CTKM) 
scheme has been proposed separately by three research 
groups [4, 14, 151. Members of the multicast group are 
leaf nodes of the key distribution tree. Each member shares 
a unique KEK with the group manager. In addition, each 
member receives all the KEKs corresponding to the internal 
nodes in its path to the root of the tree. The root’s key is the 
traffic encrypting key (TEK). 
Distributed flat key management: This protocol is a 
distributed version of CFKM-DMG described earlier in this 
section (refer to [4]). There is no group manager in this 
scheme. Each member of the multicast is trusted and no one 
holdskreates more than one traffic encrypting key and W 
key encrypting keys where W is the number of bits in the bi- 
nary representation of member IDS. Members joining early 
generate the keys and are called key holders. The ones join- 
ing late, receive keys from these key holders. 
Tabular comparison. In summary, we list the merits 
and the shortcomings of existing secure scalable multicas- 
ting protocols in Table 5 .  We first define the terminology 
used in the table of comparison. In particular, n denotes the 
number of members in the multicast group, 1 represents the 
number of subgroups in the group, and 1 denotes the aver- 
age subgroup size. c denotes the number of children of the 
sender of the multicast data and d represents the degree of 
a hierarchical distribution tree. The inter-relations between 
these parameters are 0 5 55 d ,  1 x & and 1 5 c 5 d.  
Note that we list CTKM in the table as a representa- 
tive for CFKM-DMG and the distributed flat scheme, which 
are variations of CTKM. The hierarchical scheme uses the 
largest number of keys while the flat schemes use fewer 
keys. In all these schemes the session key is modified 
each time a host joins/leaves. Some of the KEKs are also 
changed. The number of KEKs updated is different in each 
of these protocols. Consequently, all these protocols suffer 
from 1 affects n scalability problem. Also, the distributed 
flat scheme is vulnerable to security attacks from members 
of the group. Both the flat schemes also cannot exclude col- 
luding members [4]. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a dual encryption scheme for 
scalable secure multicasting. We use hierarchical subgroup- 
ing to support scalability. Group control authority is dele- 
gated to subgroup managers. We use two sets of key en- 
crypting keys to provide the capability to deny access of 
multicast data to the subgroup managers. Members of the 
multicast group receive both the key encrypting keys. Sub- 
group managers also need to join the group to get access 
to multicast data. Alternatively, they can participate in the 
multicast assisting in key distribution and access control. 
7 
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ETM SMKD GKMP PDKD Iolus 
Access control mechanism Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Capability certificate No No Yes No No 
We are working on the development of a prototype of our 
secure multicasting framework. We plan to use the proto- 
type to quantify the appropriate subgroup size, the number 
of subgroups and the number of key encrypting keys based 
on group size and the physical distribution of members in the 
group. The next phase is to extend our protocol to support 





Join scalability Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Leave scalability Yes No No No Yes 
Data transmission scalability No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
I affects n scalability Yes No No No Yes 
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